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Whose World? What History?
Corinne Lathrop Gilb
With increased general awareness of global interconnectedness and a new
millennium approaching, scholars are reevaluating how they present what used to
be called world history or universal history and now might be called world systems (of various kinds), comparative civilizations, international history, the history of the world, or the history of globalization. A primary issue is, what is the
appropriate unit of study—if not the nation-state, then the kind of broad spheres
of influence known in the past as "the world"; whole civilizations (however
defined); political/economic systems; or the entire globe (from whose point of
view)? Behind each of these approaches is a tacit or explicit agenda, a set of
assumptions, a criterion of relevancy, a presumed methodology, and related standards of evidence.
Contributing to the debate are three new books: Civilizations and World
Systems, Studying World-Historical Change, edited by Stephen K. Sanderson;
Conceptualizing Global History, edited by Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens;
and a posthumous collection of Marshall Hodgson's work entitled Rethinking
World History, edited by Edmund Burke III. It is a debate about history, but
almost all the writers in Sanderson's book and some in Conceptualizing Global
History are not historians. The implication is that world history might be taught
by sociologists or interdisciplinary teams. The "ing" in each of the titles signifies
a continuing search for new understanding.
Much of the debate is about definitions, including definitions of history
itself. All of the old debates are still with us—e.g., whether the paradigms of
physics or of biology should be taken as models. The writers in Sanderson's book
and some in Conceptualizing Global History lean toward the nomothetic school
(looking for general laws). The influence of the ancient Greeks, especially Plato,
is still apparent—i.e., a concept of natural laws derived not only from the
Copernican revolution but also from something akin to the Greek concept of universal Logos; the belief that forms are primary and their detailed manifestations
are derivative; an assumption like that of the Greeks that "the deepest cause of
things [is not their beginning but] their telos, their purpose and final actuality." '
Sixty years ago, Johan Huizinga wrote: "History is ... 'an intellectual form'
... Every civilization must hold its own history to the true one." 2 To the extent
that this is true, as the West orients itself more thoroughly to the globe, it still
tends to view the world through its own lenses. (All but one of the writers in these
three new books are Western). Moreover, as life-worlds (to use Heidegger's
phrase) are being reconstructed, mental maps are still distorted even for those
whose self-other distinctions are not geographic but Marxist (the "exploited" ver-
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sus their "exploiters"). Except indirectly, the viewpoints of linguists, archaeologists, anthropologists, and philosophers, among others, are not very much included in these three books.
In former times, world history meant the history of the world "as we know
it." As Wolf Schafer has written in Conceptualizing Global History: "the 'world'
of world history was non-global most of the time." 3 "The ancient totality of history was based on civilizational arrogance and geographical ignorance." 4 The
Greek word oikumene, Schafer says, meant the inhabited lands of the world
known to the Greeks. Similar kinds of parochialism have characterized history
down to the present. Even William McNeill, the dean of post-1945 American
world historians, has been accused of being Eurocentric.
Another approach has been to reserve the phrase "world history" for the period after the world became linked together by economic institutions. This was
what Marx had in mind when he contended that the world was not economically
integrated before 1500 and therefore the phrase "world history" applies only to
the post-1500 period and especially to the period after big industry had produced
world history for the first time.5 Once integrated by capitalism, presumably the
world could subsequently be integrated by communism. History of the economically integrated world, as Marxists have defined it, is not the same as the global
history that Mazlish postulates when he emphasizes environment because the
world has always been one world in terms of environment.
Universal histories, notably those written by 19th and early 20th century
Europeans, are analogous to what historians of geopolitics have called universal
states or universal empires. These occurred when a formerly peripheral state
within a state system rose to dominate the other states, creating—for a relatively
short time—a single large political unit.6 David Wilkinson, one of Sanderson's
authors, distinguishes between universal states—which unified, centralized, and
homogenized regional and local identities—and universal empires, which ruled
over greater heterogeneity.7 Most of his list of 23 universal empires existed before
1500 A.D. While they were "universal" within their context and might claim universality, they fell far short of global dominance.
It would be interesting to know how many of the 23 produced "universal histories" and how such histories might compare to Europe's later universal histories
(even though post-Roman Europe never became a universal empire). The usual
charge against the European universal histories is that they were implicitly or
explicitly imperialistic, presuming to encompass the history of mankind in one
often-teleological metaphysical sweep. They bore some resemblance to the
Judeo-Christian-Islamic messianic tradition but also borrowed concepts from the
Greeks." Metahistory (as distinguished from macrohistory) is not in favor among
most historians today.
Hypothetically, a universal history could be written that was not so metaphysical
or imperialistic. Manfred Kossok, in Conceptualizing Global History,
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4
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defines universal history as "the total temporal, spatial, and structural process of
human development." In the narrower sense, it means "the compression of
human history into a worldwide system of reciprocal communication (of both a
dominant and a nondominant nature), penetrations, influences, and dependencies." 9 He says there could be a place for universal history shorn of its
Eurocentrism. Its conceptualizations, Kossock says, would need to borrow perspectives from more than one civilizational tradition.
This kind of amalgam has yet to be forged, and will be difficult to achieve.
Buultjens comments that the tradition of writing history was not well established
in India and Africa until recent times. The Europeans, of course, are not the only
people who have thought of themselves as the center of the world.
Historian Fernand Braudel first postulated a world system in 1949.10 Later,
most scholars focusing on systems have been social scientists, not historians, and
often Marxist. Looking at the world in terms of system appears to be a very
Western perspective, not only borrowing the metaphors of physics where Greek
ideas still lurk but also influenced by issues and paradigms rising out of the
mechanisms and social structures of the industrial age. Histories of world systems emphasize geopolitics or economics or both in interrelationship. Social
stratification is a factor, too. It is the interrelationships that are the most intriguing. None of these writers claims that geopolitical systems and economic systems
completely coincided.
Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, in Sanderson's book, define
a world system as a large intersocietal and intercultural network, rarely co-extensive with the world as a whole until the late 20th century. There have been, they
say, kin-based, state-based, and market-based world systems. Sanderson's book,
in general, does not dwell on the debates among anthropologists about the
sequences (or not) of tribes, chiefdoms, and states. Authors disagree about
whether there has been only one or many economic world-systems. Chase-Dunn
and Hall say there have been a number of world-systems, becoming fewer as they
have become larger. State-based world-systems "prior to the modern one oscillated between core-wide empires and interstate systems," or they broke up into
mini-states."
There has been much debate about how long world systems have existed.
One set of writers claims that systems have been around for a very long time.
Sociobiologists describe "political" and "economic" arrangements in the worlds
of insects, birds, and mammals. We know that trade was practiced by the ancestors of man before modern man evolved. Barry K. Gills argues in Sanderson's
book that world-systems go back nearly 5000 years.' 2 Chase-Dunn and Hall say
that world-economies lacking political or military unification existed throughout
history (they use the word "world" in its old pre-global sense). Frank and Gills
argue that capital accumulation has oscillated between private families and the
Published
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accumulation before 1500 was based on demand tribute in the form of added
product (payment as work, goods, or money); later, accumulation was based on
producing added value.13
Immanuel Wallerstein, another of Sanderson's writers, has written in a
Marxist vein that political hegemony was rare and brief in world history. When it
was achieved, efficient capital accumulators did the achieving. Having economic advantage led to political power, but economic power could be independent of
political power. Usually, there was a sequential development from commercialto industrial- to financial-hegemony. When all three coincided, then a core area
had brief economic hegemony over the semiperiphery and periphery. The capitalist world economy, which he says began to emerge around 1450 A.D., was
characterized by commodification, proletarianization, mechanization, contractualization, and polarization.
Pre-1500 economic networks, he has written, were world-empires rather than
world economies. His use of a hyphen implies a unit less than global in scope.
World-empires joined their edges to the center by the collection of tribute but left
edge production systems relatively intact; the capitalist world-economy incorporated edge production systems into its division of labor based on the chain from
raw materials-to-finished product. In world-empires, unequal exchange was
based on force; in the capitalist system, it was based on supply and demand with
force latent.14 Wilkinson, in an earlier critique of Wallerstein, wrote that military
hegemons began as economically backward fringe states and that it is best to
think of political-military and economic systems as two separate entities. All of
the writers seem to ignore Polanyi's typology, which emphasized that there were
many different modes of trade, many of them sponsored by political rulers.15
Gills writes, in Sanderson's book: The definition of world system rests on the
basis of exchange of surplus. It "implies a division of labor and brings in its train
systemic, political, social, ideological, cultural, and even religious rhythms."
"World system structure does not involve a single core and a single periphery, but
rather an interlinked set of center-periphery complexes ... joined together in an
overall ensemble ... world systemic multicentrality is hierarchically structured."
16

Some of these authors use the words network and system interchangeably,
which leads to confusion. A network is a set of linked discrete nodes. Presumably
some nodes could drop off, or the nature of the links could change, and it would
still be a network. The idea of system is based on the imagery of a living organism or a complex machine. Presumably, in a system the whole and its parts
depend on one another and the whole has both a transcendent and an embracing
quality. Culture-boundedness lies at the root of many categories used for analysis, especially the concept of system.
Some of these writers apply the term networks to trade but apply the word
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4
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munity. Hodgson points out how pervasive the corporate idea was in medieval
Europe; the early European state was the "king's body." Premodern merchant networks were sometimes itinerant communities but they were not corporative.
Presumably, economic networks changed into systems when multinational corporations replaced merchant diasporas.
By failing to focus on cultures as a primary variable, systems historians leave
out a vital ingredient. Today, we say that a corporate body has a culture, whether
it is political or economic. Religion, of course, is an important aspect of culture.
Wallerstein, Frank, and Wilkinson do not think of religion as a separate system,
as the Roman Catholic church with its Jesuit and other orders seems to have been
in the 16th century. Nor do they honor religion's primary role in the shaping of
political culture from the very beginning.
The debate in Sanderson's book is whether to interpret history in terms of
systems or civilizations. Definitions of civilization vary widely. The roots of
Western biases in definition go far back in time; indeed, they are prehistoric.
Western scholars since the 18th century have often cited the existence of cities as
one of the prime indicators of civilization, yet today we are told that hunter-gatherers were reluctant to become sedentary and—in the Middle East—disdained
sedentary pig-herders (a possible explanation of proscriptions against pork-eating).17 Today, Arabian Bedouins and the heirs of American Indian chieftains
sometimes express an anti-urban bias. When people did settle down in the ancient
Middle East, cities gradually attained their symbolic cultural role. Since histories
were written by sedentary people, non-sedentary (and certainly violent) invaders
were depicted as uncivilized barbarians—including the Indo-Europeans despite
their enormous influence on the world's languages; the Vikings, despite their considerable maritime achievements; and the Mongols of the 13th century and later
despite their skills with horses, the cities that came under the rule of Qubilai
Khan, and Tamerlane's Samarqand.' 8
Some definitions of civilization have been blatantly Eurocentric. Eighteenth
century Europeans sometimes thought the word applied exclusively to themselves. In 1926 James Henry Breasted wrote, in The Conquest of Civilization, that
northwest Europe had the highest level of civilized achievement in the world,
partially because of racial superiority." By this time, of course, Western
Europeans had long been invaders, but the difference was that they were writing
the histories.
Some scholars think of civilization in a more objective way in terms of the
interrelatedness of a number of factors. Fernand Braudel, for example, wrote that
civilizations are to be defined "in terms of geography, cultural (i.e., linguistic and
religious) zones, urban cultures, and the societies and economics that sustain
them and the ways of thought or mentalities that grow in the context created by
[these] variables." 20
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from whence does the coherence come? Many say it comes from high culture.
Anthropologist Alfred Louis Kroeber, who did most of his field work among
North American Indians, defined civilization as style or superstyle, a definition to
which Braudel objected. Kroeber wrote in Configurations of Culture Growth
(1944) that civilization has an image which influences and modifies its disparate
elements. Its patterns he said, give the parts relationship to one another and to the
civilization as a whole. His student, Gordon Hewes, wrote in 1975 that Kroeber
"treats civilizations almost exclusively in terms of their aesthetic and intellectual
components, largely detached from surrounding or underlying social, economic,
political, or even religious phenomena." 21
Definitions of civilizational coherence are often elitist. Arnold Toynbee
defined civilization as a state of society in which a creative minority of the population is liberated from economic activities. Max Weber's view was that:
"Coherence is a property not of civilization as a whole but only of the organization of life of its culture-defining strata." 22
Vytautis Kavolis, a former president of the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilizations, once wrote: "A civilization (or at least a classical civilization) is best defined as the largest functioning sociocultural organization, encompassing several states and languages, held together by a literate tradition maintained by full-time students of theoretical writings central to it." 23
William McNeill says in Sanderson's book: "A shared literary canon, and expectations framed by that canon, are probably central to what we mean by a civilization." Cohesion, he says, comes from continual circulation of news and
nuances of meaning." 24
These kinds of definitions have spurred anti-establishment scholars to
eschew the term. Wallerstein thought it had little practical value and said at one
time that civilizations were only ideological constructs serving rhetorical purposes and acting as legitimization projects for specific groups.25 When some presentday historians characterize many past histories of nation-states in the same way,
it is not to make a case for greater objectivity but to legitimize their own use of
history for power-seeking purposes.
The question of how parts relate to the whole keeps arising. McNeill writes
in his self-critique that in 1963 he followed V. Gordon Childe and others in defining civilization as "a society in which occupational specialization allowed the
emergence of high skills—administrative, military, artisanal, literary, and artistic." He now admits that that definition is not adequate for later eras. The question is, he says: "how do all the different skills and habits and outlooks of sharers in a civilization fit together into a more or less coherent whole?" 26 Louis
Dumont has also said that the distinctiveness of a civilization arises from its dominant ideology, controlled by a conception of the relationship of the individual to
a social whole.27
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4
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is critical of Hodgson's emphasis on high culture: "Because it focuses upon culture, the civilizationalist approach favored by Hodgson has only a tenuous grasp
on the crucially important long-range demographic, economic, and social transformations which accompanied (perhaps even preceded) the onset of the modern
age." 28
This is not a fair charge against Hodgson, whose comparisons between
medieval European and Middle Eastern law are much more extensive and seem
more insightful than the relatively brief references to law in Conceptualizing
Global History. Louis Menand III writes in the latter book: " ... the notion of individualistic human rights does not exist in Islamic political theory." 29 Hodgson
paints quite a different picture.
' T h e Islamic sharia law was largely an expression of individuals not only for
their personal life but for the whole ordering of society." 30 "Apparently, it was
largely merchants that drew up the sharia law in the first place ... and the scholars of the law, the ulama, were often of mercantile families or even merchants
themselves." The consequences were that merchants had "a certain veto power
in the society as a whole." 31 ". . . the authority of the sharia law was such that.
. . no alternative institutions, which might have neutralized its effect, could
achieve legitimization and hence long-run durability." 32 N o "parochial corporate
entity was allowed a permanent status." 33 Everything became the responsibility
of the community as a whole and therefore of the individuals who made it up.
The law was highly egalitarian and left many relations up to private contracts
between responsible individuals. Little was left to ascribed status. It was not
required that offices be filled from fixed hereditary lines. Consequently, before
the 16th century, there was a high degree of social mobility and also of geographic mobility. 34 The sharia law "gave the Iranic-Semitic populations at last a
common vehicle for their traditions." 35

Hodgson contrasts this Islamic pattern with Occidental "hierarchical corporativism," with its status by ascription.36 He describes Islamic law as serving
"communal moralism," Western law as serving "corporative formalism." 37
In any case, there are still questions about how civilizational patterns, high
culture, essence, or dominant ideology shape the relationship of the civilization's
parts to one another. Neither Sanderson nor Mazlish has recognized the substantial anthropological literature about culture and personality. 38 Apparently
unversed in many aspects of philosophy or aesthetics and probably eschewing
Jungian psychology, systems historians do not incorporate theories of style or
symbol into their mode of interpretation. Yet, the literature on symbols is vast and
relevant.39
Anthropologist Florence Kluckhohn, not quoted or cited in these recent
books, has written that culture includes both values and symbols. Values refer to
existential assumptions underlying personal behavior and institutional patterns,
and to principles which direct choice. Cultural values spring from the basic facts
of human
nature,
whichScholarsArchive,
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value priorities (as Hodgson illustrates comparing Europe and the Middle East).
Any system contains both a dominant value profile and subcultural value profiles.40 This mode of analysis has yet to be used in detail by historians, civilizationists, or systems scholars.
There has been much debate among comparative civilizationists about the
relationships—temporal and otherwise—of empires to civilizations. They have
some tendency to reify civilizations as if civilizations had the kind of determinable spatial-temporal boundaries empirically discernible for polities. Carroll
Quigley wrote that when a universal empire—a single political unit dominated by
a formerly peripheral state—in turn dominates a whole civilization, that civilization and society entered a golden age of peace and prosperity with little innovation or economic expansion before being destroyed by outsiders. Matthew Melko,
one of the authors in Sanderson's book, wrote in 1985: "Civilizations frequently
end in empires, but not always," especially if they are pluralistic such as Europe
and Southeast Asia.41
Melko thinks civilizations encompass a multitude of integrated systems.42
Wilkinson's view is almost the opposite. He has written that the later "civilizations" listed by Quigley were clearly parts of larger transactional networks
because of long-term entrainment in a single macro states system and process. He
has—in effect—tried to escape the cultural issues and circumvent lingering
Greek influences by redefining civilization in terms of level and connectedness,
not level and uniformity. Civilization, he says, is military-political connectedness,
which can include links by conflict (borrowing from George Simmel's insights).
Civilizations are world systems whose relevant criteria are cities and closed transactional networks, not writing or cultural coherence. Around 1500 B.C., he says,
Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilizations fused (a fusion is a relatively symmetric egalitarian coupling). After that, the Central Civilization resulting from that
fusion gradually engulfed all other civilizations in the world (engulfment is asymmetric unequal coupling—the asymmetry in this case apparently deriving from
the fact that other parts of the world were originally peripheral to Egypt and
Mesopotamia). Along the way there were occasional bondings and non-bonding
elastic collisions between civilizations which he calls convergence. Convergence
might be by war, trade, empire, migration, cultural flows or diplomacy. There
were, as Toynbee said, abortive or satellite civilizations. There was a plurality of
civilizations until the late 19th or early 20th century. No civilization fell because
falling would require that all of its cities be destroyed or depopulated. Since this
never happened, it is best to talk of turnover of civilizations, not collapse and
rebirth. Now, according to Wilkinson, there is only one civilization.
Originally, trading areas, which he calls oikumenes, were larger than civilizations, which were the areas in which states could rule, fight, or ally.
Oikumenes were economically linked urban networks. Since one civilization has
now engulfed all the others and there is now a worldwide oikumene, Wilkinson's
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4
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contention is that civilization and world system are now the same. 4 ' (He seems to
fuse the concepts of network and system.)
Kavolis wrote in 1988: "Globalization theory analyzes the processes by
which the world is becoming a 'single place,' a frame that has to be taken into
account in acting and in interpreting.44 Conceptualizing Global History, edited by
Mazlish and Buultjens, grew out of an international conference at Bellagio, Italy,
in the summer of 1991 (Sanderson's Civilizations and World Systems grew out of
an unrelated conference in Berkeley, California, in the summer of 1989). 45 Editor
Mazlish says global history is contemporary (or futurist) history, not universal
history or world history (and not systems history or the history of civilizations).
It is policy oriented.
Much of the book that he and Ralph Buultjens have edited reads like another effort to undermine or circumvent established elites and power relationships.
Neva R. Goodwin writes: "In place of the details of the old standard histories,
which portray local incidents and individual actors, global history will depend
upon generalizations about the effects of (or on) human beings in groups or as a
species. Unlike histories that gain their coherence from a geographic, gender, or
ethnic definition, global history will depend upon themes." 46 The scholarly
approach should be interdisciplinary.
Mazlish writes about "the challenge of creating institutions other than the
nation-state as the subject matter of history; the possibility of global opinion as
an ethical force; the issue of identity.47 If the nation-state is no longer the prime
actor, then maybe the prime actors are movements, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations. (One is immediately reminded of the proposal before the United Nations to create a second branch of its legislature consisting of representatives from nongovernmental associations.) Wolf Schafer
writes: "The works of the new global history tend to be thematically focused on
recurring processes like war and colonization or on cross-cultural patterns like
the spread of disease, technology, and trading networks." 48 This book deliberately downplays religion.
Government in Mazlish's book is implicitly not the "command of the sovereign." Focus is on the U.N. Declarations of Human Rights. Menand notes that the
emphasis since 1945 on democracy and human rights stems from English-speaking and Western European nations. He traces the idea of the rule of law to the
Magna Carta. The three-fifths of the world which has yet to adopt human rights,
he concludes, needs a rule of law and pluralist democracy.49 This version of
explicitly presentist and agenda-driven history is as Eurocentric in its values,
assumptions, and interpretations of history as any universal history ever was.
Implicit and explicit agendas abound in Mazlish's book. He has American
academic politics in mind when he visualizes a global history association (different from the already-existing World History Association), a new journal, revised
curricula,
andby
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In this age when the economy of overseas Chinese is close in size to that of
Japan, the agenda of Wang Gungwu, Vice Chancellor of the University of Hong
Kong and one of Mazlish's authors, might be seen as an effort to gain more legitimization not only for "the notion of sojourning in relatively open trading societies" but also for immigration which allows immigrants to continue to be part of
close-knit ethnic diasporas or allows political refugees to continue to promote
their political values together with like-minded people around the world.50 He
mentions only briefly the pre-World War II German concept that Germans in
Chile, Argentina, Southern Brazil, North America, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and
Russia were still Germans. He does not discuss pre 1939 German international
cartels.
The problem with explicitly agenda-driven history or history focused on
selective themes is that it fails to consider adequately the all-important factor of
context. Without an adequate understanding of context, not only are histories
incomplete, but they also fail to provide a sufficient background for public policymaking, one of the agendas of the Mazlish book. Just as we need to understand
how the food chain works in order to formulate reasonable environmental policies, so we also need better understanding of how any facet of history is imbedded in a multifaceted context. The historian's emphasis on archival research does
not by itself serve this purpose. There is a sociological and cultural bias driving
any person's or institution's selection of what evidence to place into archives.
What the historian harvests from archives also depends on what questions he
(she) is asking and his (her) a priori assumptions of relevance. Many subjects
require an interdisciplinary approach not yet fully adopted by historians.
The subject of cities in history covered in Civilizations and World Systems
provides an excellent example. Both Wilkinson and Chase-Dunn use urban
demography as a prime indicator. Using geographers' models, Chase-Dunn and
Hall found: "Both political and economic power distributions are reflected in
changes in city-size distributions." 51 Andrew Bosworth writes: "the number of
cities, their rates of growth, and their hierarchical distribution can each be used
as economic barometers." 52 Wilkinson has written: "One useful indicator of the
statist/ capitalist balance is the balance between cities of the same size that are
state capitals (i.e., power-maintained) and those that are commercial centers (i.e.,
trade maintained)." " He seems to disregard the fact that much commerce has
tended to flow through capitals and/or to be power-maintained. Ignoring the fact
that rulers in such disparate places as pre-1500 Europe and Mughal India tended
to be peripatetic, Chase-Dunn and Hall say, "large empires should generally have
large cities." 53
Many of the writers in the Mazlish and Sanderson books try to be "scientific" about cities, relying on the population data in Tertius Chandler's Four
Thousand Years of Urban Growth: An Historical Census (1987).54 Yet, estimates
of
population before the modern era vary considerably depending on 10
their
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4
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premises, including how much hinterland is included.
All of the writers underplay the role of cities as cultural centers. One does
cite Norell et al. who have contended that there has been no significant relation
between creativity and the size of a civilization's largest city, the growth of the
civilization, and the degree of centralization.55 All of them downplay the role of
religion, but religion cannot be left out of the history of cities. In ancient Sumer
and Egypt, individual cities had their own gods and the ability of the city to
expand its range of control depended to a considerably extent on the appeal of its
gods and how well they lent themselves to syncretism. Rome built its empire in
part by coopting the gods of other cities. A network of Roman Catholic bishops
sustained otherwise nearly-abandoned city sites during the late days of the
Roman empire. Down to the present, churches in Europe, mosques in the Middle
East, and temples in Hindu India have played a substantial role in cities. Over
millennia religion gave cohesion to the trading groups that traversed wide areas
and threaded through cities. The sale of tithes-in-kind for the church helped fuel
the great medieval and Renaissance European financial/trading centers about
which Braudel has written.
Because they tend to reify cities, these authors in Sanderson's book (except
Bosworth) also tend to ignore the fact that individual cities were often crossroads
for more than one system—economic, political, religious. Each of the systems
included its own set of cities that overlapped but was not identical to that of the
others. The central city may have been different in each case. The unanswered
question is, what were the relationships between civilization, economics, and
power, as they were manifested in or worked through cities?
Preoccupied as they are with macro reconnaissance, these writers do not get
down to the fine grain, which I contend is best understood in terms of values
(including concepts of space and time), symbols, and rhythms (including the
rhythms of the embracing culture, the rhythms of human biology and natural
environment, and the rhythms of institutional life and human ecology). One question is how rhythms differ for different kinds of people and how social and cultural rhythms connect to the facts of human psychology and physiology. A person's mental maps, no doubt, affect his/her rhythms. The geographic scope of a
system affects its rhythms. Large cities have a different beat from that of small
towns. Symbolic forms both reflect and help to determine the beat. 56
While some scholars are writing about a new age of city-states, Mazlish's
conclusion is that: "Global life is substituting for metropolitan life." What then
happens to cities? And to rhythms?
Another cluster of issues centers around the words modern, modernization,
modernity, and postmodern. For Hodgson, modernization was a radical break
from agrarian conditions which occurred first in Europe, but could plausibly have
taken place in Sung China or the world of Islam. Andre Gunder Frank triggered
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1997
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ment" of third world countries by the industrial West, especially the United
States—he wrote about the deliberate "development of under-development," an
aspect of neocolonialism.57
Hodgson's definition of modernity includes culture and social patterns. He
thought the hallmark of the modern age was technicalism, "a condition of calculative ... technical specialization in which the several specialists are interdependent on a large enough scale to determine patterns of expectation in the key sectors of society." He saw modernity as a global process, although the West was the
epicenter.58
Technology was the key. " ... the Renaissance did not inaugurate modernity
... it brought Europe up to the cultural level of the other major civilizations of the
Oikumene. It did so in some measure by assimilating the advances of the other
Asian civilizations"—e.g., gunpowder firearms, compass, stern-post rudder, decimal notation, and the university. Consequently, technical specialization
increased the accumulation of inventions, which led to "qualitative change in the
level and kind of human social organization." 59
Cited in these books, Modelski and Thompson have argued that a succession
of active zones of innovation are what drives world system evolution.60 Peter Hall
noted in The World Cities (1966) that cities' connectedness to the world system
of economic change increases with technological progress.61
Other writers place more emphasis on Western cultural definitions of modernity. Mazlish writes: "The modern was positivistic, technocratic, rationalistic,
believed in linear progress, absolute truths, rational planning, nationalism, and
the standardization of knowledge and production." 62 The capitalist form of modernization, he says, postulated a rational man pursuing his own self interest. The
opponents of this idea extol altruism.61 While the West has moved into post-modernism, many people in the world still want modernity.
The term "modernism" had different meaning when it was coopted by artists,
writers, and architects in the late 19th century and early 20th century Germany,
Austria, and Italy, as well as in Western Europe and the United States. Mazlish
has something else in mind when he identifies two phases of "modernism," one
around 1948, another from 1910 to 1915, and mentions its "shadowy and shifting
nature".64
In many of its forms, such as Dadaism, cultural modernism was intended as
a repudiation of the past. The same can be said of post-modernism.
Toynbee used the term post-modern in his Study of History to describe the
age from the 1870s which he said was slipping into irrationality. Kavolis has said:
"The only constant in the various accounts of 'postmodernism' is self-conscious
rejection of 'modernism' with its tendencies toward dialectic thought, hierarchy
of values, universal forms, master narratives encapsulating the meaning of history, and efforts after a not yet forgotten coherence." Postmodern is a mode of interhttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4
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multiperspectival, "transparent," nature.65
Mazlish defines post-modernism as the abandonment of the Enlightenment
project, perhaps best illustrated by French intellectuals Foucault, Derrida, and
Lacan. Foucault wrote that Nietzsche's "death of god" also entailed the "death of
man"—i.e., of humanism. Instead of man, there were structures, system.66
Mazlish comments: " . . . it is the Western historian who structures history in terms
of modernism and postmodernism and imposes it on the history of the world." 67
Deconstruction has been a hallmark of the postmodern age. Burke refers to
"post-Foucault" discourse.
Beyond postmodernity are the social and cultural revolutions of the
Information Age not discussed by these writers. Post-post-modernism began with
new ideas about mathematics and logic which appeared in the first half of the
20th century. Recently, cognitive anthropology and cyborg anthropology have
begun to replace structural anthropology. The science of complexity and fractal
geometry express the new "wired world" based on computers and the Internet.
Business organizations—especially those in new high-technology fields—
emphasize individual autonomy more than hierarchy. Webs and networks are
replacing structures; fluidity and flexibility are replacing standardization and fixity.68
One question yet to be addressed is whether continuity can or should be sustained under these new circumstances, and, if so, what should be the forms and
content of history when the Internet obliterates here/there distinctions and collapses time. People still yearn for meaning, hope, stability, and community, but
how are these to be found amidst disruptive changes? When the language of the
Internet is English, can it be said that the issue of Eurocentrism has gone away?
Clearly, much more remains to be said about approaches to world history.

Endnotes
'Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind, Understanding the Ideas
That Have Shaped Our World View (New York: Ballantine, 1993); 61, Thomas S.
Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy and the Development of
Western Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). Stedman B.
Noble points out the fallacy of relying on Greek concepts. History, he says,
should use Darwinian concepts. "The foundation of Darwin's analysis became the
view that each individual organism is different and each one passes its differences
on to its progeny." Therefore, organisms could not be grouped into types with
fixed properties. This was a break with Aristotle. Civilizations, Noble says, are
like species with Darwinian characteristics. (In "World History versus World
13
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1997
Civilization," a paper to the ISCSC June 1993 conference in Scranton.)

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 35 [1997], No. 35, Art. 4
56

COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS REVIEW

2

John Huizinga, "A Definition of the Concept of History," chap. 1 in
Philosophy and History, the Ernst Cassirer Festchrift, ed. Raymond Klibansky
and H. J. Paton (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1936, 1963).
3

Wolf Schafer, "Global History, Historiographical Feasibility and
Environmental Reality," in Conceptualizing Global History, ed. Bruce Mazlish
and Ralph Buultjens (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993):51.
"Ibid.:52.
'Karl Marx,
Marx und der
Conceptualizing
Interpretation of

"Die Deutsche Ideologic," 1845-1846; Manfred Kossok, Karl
Begriff der Weltgeschichte (1984) cited by Kossok in
Global History, ed. Mazlish: 96. M. M. Bober, Karl Marx's
History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948).

6

Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to
Historical Analysis (New York: Macmillan, 1961); and a series of papers about
states systems and empires by David Wilkinson, Matthew Melko, and John Hord
delivered to annual conferences of the International Society for the Comparative
Study of Civilizations. Many of these are cited in the references of David
Wilkinson's "Civilizations Are World Systems!" in Civilizations and World
Systems, ed. Stephen K. Sanderson (Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 1995).
'David Wilkinson, "Civilizations, States Systems and Universal Empires,"
paper delivered to the ISCSC conference in Buffalo, May 26-28, 1983; and John
Hord, "Times of Order, Times of Chaos," to the same conference. Wilkinson also
distinguishes between a dominant power's empire, a great power's empire, and an
expanding regional empire.
"Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth
Century Europe (Baltimore: 1973). See also Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang
des Abendlandes. The Decline of the West, 2 vols. tr. C. E. Atkinson (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1932), primarily a comparison of Western and Greco-Roman
civilizations. Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History, 12 vols. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1934-1961). Sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin's Social and
Cultural Dynamics,
4 vols. (New York: American Book Co., 1937-1941);
Sorokin, Modern Historical and Social Philosophies (New York: Dover, 1963)
(Sorokin was critical of Toynbee); and the writings of Herbert Spencer such as
First Principles (London, 1870) and Principles of Sociology (London: 1885). See
Clyde Kluckhohn's article in American Anthropologist (1936).

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4

14

Gilb: Whose World? What History?

57

'Manfred Kossock, "From Universal History to Global History," in
Conceptualizing Global History, eds. Mazlish and Buultjens:97; and Ralph
Buultjens, "Global History and the Third World," ibid.:87.
10

Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the
Age of Philip II, 2 vols. tr. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper and Row, 1949).
See also J. Ortega Y. Gasset, "History as a System" in Philosophy and History,
eds. Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton (London: Clarendon Press, 1936).
Andre Gunder Frank, "A Plea for World System History," Journal of World
History, 2 (1991):l-28.
"Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, "Cross-World-System
Comparisons," in Civilizations and World Systems, ed. Sanderson: 109, 119, 120
and Sanderson and Hall, ibid.:96.
12

Barry K. Gills, "Capital and Power in the Processes of World History," in
Civilizations and World Systems, ed. Sanderson: 140; Andre Gunder Frank and
Barry K. Gills, eds., The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?
(London: Routledge, 1991).
"See Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the WorldEconomy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas
D. Hall, eds., Core Periphery Relations in Precapitalist Worlds (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1991); Chase-Dunn and Hall in Civilizations and World Systems,
ed. Sanderson:115, quoting Wilkinson; and Stephen K. Sanderson and Hall,
"World Systems Approaches to World Historical Change," in Civilizations..., ed.
Sanderson: 10, citing Frank and Gills, and 103 citing Chase-Dunn and Hall. See
Andre Gunder Frank, World Accumulation, 1492-1789 (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1978).
"Sanderson and Hall, ibid.:98. I have relied on the brilliant summary of
Wallerstein's views in Wilkinson, "World Economic Theories and Problems:
Quigley vs. Wallerstein vs. Central Civilization," a paper to the ISCSC conference, Hampton, Va., May 26-29, 1988. See Immanuel Wallerstein, "Hold the
Tiller Firm, on Methods and the Unit of Analysis," in Civilizations ... ed.
Sanderson, and The Capitalist World-Economy
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979) and The Modern World Systems, vols. 1 and 2 (New
York: 1974, 1980). Carroll Quigley said there was a core/periphery in all periods.
Gills and Frank said there were only temporary and shifting regional hegemons.
"Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg, and Harry W. Pearson, eds., Trade and
Market
in theby
Early
(Glencoe,1997
111.: The Free Press, 1951).
Published
BYUEmpires
ScholarsArchive,
15

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 35 [1997], No. 35, Art. 4

58

COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS REVIEW

,6

Barry K. Gills, in Civilizations..., ed., Sanderson: 144, 145.

"Bryan Bunch and Alexander Hellemans, The Timetables of Technology
(New York: Touchstone, 1993):5, 75, 77.
18

See J. P. Mallory, In Search of the Indo-Europeans. Language, Archaeology
and Myth (London: Thames and Hudson, 1989; P. G. Foote and D. M. Wilson,
The Viking Achievement (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1970); David Morgan,
The Mongols (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
"James Henry Breasted, The Conquest of Civilization (New York: Literary
Guild, 1926, 1938).
^Paraphrased by Victor Roudometof and Roland Robertson, "Globalization,
World-System-Theory, and the Comparative Study of Civilizations: Issues of
Theoretical Logic in World-Historical Sociology," in Civilizations..., ed.,
Sanderson: 282. David Richardson has defined civilization as a society or ecumene containing all the people who share a world view, which is a matrix of intuitive cognitions and feelings.
21

Gordon W. Hewes, "Alfred Louis Kroeber as a Pioneer of Civilizational
Analysis," paper for 1975 ISCSC conference at Pittsburgh, citing Kroeber,
Configurations of Culture Growth (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1944); Kroeber, Style and Civilization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957);
and other works.
^Paraphrased by Vytautis Kavolis, "Civilization Theory and Collective
Identity in the Postmodern-Globalizing Age," a paper presented to the ISCSC
conference May 26,29, 1988 at Hampton University, citing Max Weber, The
Sociology of Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963); Weber, Economy and
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978); and other works by Weber.
23

Kavolis, ibid.

24

William H. McNeill, "The Rise of the West after Twenty-Five Years," in
Civilizations...: 309. Reprint of an essay published in 1990). McNeill and
Hodgson taught at the University of Chicago's history department in the same
period. Hodgson died in 1968 at the age of 48.
25

See Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science (London: Polity
Press,
1991).
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4
16

Gilb: Whose World? What History?

«.r

26

McNeill, op. cit.:308. Melko in Civilizations...:29: civilizations vary in
their degree of integration, both over time and compared to one another; 31: "All
the characteristics of a civilization relate to and modify one another."
27

Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism:
Modern
Ideology
Anthropological Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

in

28

Edmund Burke III, in Marshall G. S. Hodgson, Rethinking World History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993):xx.
29

Louis Menand, "Human Rights
Conceptualizing..., ed. Mazlish: 184.

as

Global

Imperative,"

in

'"Hodgson, Ibid.: 114, 115.
31

Ibid.:116, 117.

32

Ibid.:117.

"Ibid.: 115-117, 149 et seq.
"Ibid^llS.
35

Ibid.:141.

"Ibid.: 149. However, Burke cautions that Hodgson was reading his own
predilections into his reading of Islam (p. 319).
38

See David Bidney, Theoretical Anthropology (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1953), and Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory
(New York: Crowell, 1968).
39

See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, tr. Ralph Manheim,
3 vols (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953-1957); Morris Philipson,
Aesthetics Today (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1964); Rene Wellek and Austin
Warren, Theory of Literature (New York: Harvest, 1956, 3rd ed.); Siegfried
Kracauer, Theory of Film, the Redemption of Physical Reality (New York:
Galaxy, 1966); Warren Dwight Allen, Philosophies of Music History (New York:
Dover, 1962). Walter Abell, The Collective Dream in Art (New York: Schocken,
1966); the writings of Carl Jung and much more; Corinne Lathrop Gilb, "Can We
Measure Beauty?," paper to September, 1969 New York City conference of the
American Political Science Association.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1997

17

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 35 [1997], No. 35, Art. 4

60

COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS REVIEW

""Florence Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations
Orientations (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973).

in Value

•"Matthew Melko said in his 1985 ISCSC paper: an empire occurs as the resolution of periodic crises in state systems, often when a peripheral challenger
arises to seek a power redistribution in the system. See also Quigley, op. cit.
42

Matthew Melko, The Nature of Civilizations (Boston:
1969). On conflict as connection, see Georg Simmel, Conflict
Group-Affiliations, tr. Reinhard Bendix (Glencoe, II.: Free Press,
Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press,

Porter Sargent,
and the Web of
1955); Lewis A.
1956).

"'Wilkinson, "World Economies...," op. cit.; and "Civilizations are World
Systems," chap. 10, op. cit., in Civilizations..., ed. Sanderson:251; and "Central
Civilization," chap. 2:52.
""Kavolis 1988 ISCSC paper.
"'Although I was both program chairperson and local arrangements chairperson for that ISCSC conference and also subsidized it, I played no role in the production of Sanderson's book. Its chapters cover only a few of the kinds of topics
covered in that conference.
"'Neva R. Goodwin, "The Rounding of the Earth: Ecology and Global
History, chap. 1 in Conceptualizing..., ed. Mazlish:39, 40.
47

Conceptualizing..., ed. Mazlish:21.

""Schafer in Conceptualizing..., ed. Mazlish:50.
""Menand in Conceptualizing..., ed. Mazlish:179, 181, 189.
'"Wang Gungwu, "Migrations and Its Enemies," in Conceptualizing..., ed.
Mazlish: 133; Sterling Seagrave, Lords of the Rim, The Invisible Empire of the
Overseas Chinese (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1955). At an Asia Society
conference in Seoul on May 11, 1996, the U.S. Ambassador to Korea remarked
that the Overseas Chinese had a $2.71 trillion economy. See also Wang Gungwu,
China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991; and
Wang Gungwu, Community and Nation (New South Wales: Allen and Unwin,
1992).

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4

18

Gilb: Whose World? What History?
«.r

"Chase-Dunn and Hall in Civilizations..., ed. Sanderson: 128.
"Andrew Bosworth, "World Cities and World Economic Cycles," in
Civilizations..., ed. Sanderson:211. Bosworth, p. 210, says cities form economic,
political, and social systems. I believe it is more accurate to say that such systems
work through and help to form cities. See Herbert J. Muller, The Uses of the Past,
Profiles of Former Societies (New York: Galaxy, 1952):53-55 re "The City as
Center and Symbol."
"David Wilkinson, "World Economic Theories...,":54.
M

Tertius Chandler, "Four Thousand Years of Urban Growth: An Historical
Census" (Lampeter, Dyfed, Wales: Edward Mellen Press, 1987).
"Raoul Naroll, E. C. Benjamin, E. K. Fohl, M. J. Fried, R. E. Hildreth, and
J. M. Schaefer, "Creativity: A Cross-Historical Pilot Survey," Journal of CrossCultural Psychology, 2:181-188.
%

Corinne Lathrop Gilb, "Rhythm and Energy: Linkages between the
Individual and His Environment," a paper delivered at the International
Conference on Human Energy and Consciousness at Asilomar, California, June,
1976 and again at the ISCSC conference in Dayton, June, 1995.
"Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America.
Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil, rev. ed. (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1969).
'"Burke paraphrasing Hodgson:xx, xix, 309.
"Ibid.:xix, xx.
^George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Leading Sectors and World
Powers: The Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
"Peter Hall, The World Cities (London: World University Library, 1966).
62

ed. Mazlish: 115.

63

ed. Mazlish: 118.

Conceptualizing...,
Conceptualizing...,

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1997
"Ibid.: 115-116.

19

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 35 [1997], No. 35, Art. 4
COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS REVIEW

62

65

Kavolis, ISCSC paper, 1988; Frederick Jameson, Postmodernism or the
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1992); Andreas Huyssen,
After the Great Divide: Modernism,
Mass Culture,
Postmodernism
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986); Hal Foster, ed., The
Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (Port Townsend, Washington: Bay
Press, 1983); Jean Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Charles Jencks, Post-Modernism: The
New Classicism in Art and Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1987); M.
Gottdiener, Postmodern Semiotic Material Culture, and the Forms of Postmodern
Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); S. N. Eisenstadt, ed., Patterns of Modernity
(New York: New York University Press, 1987).
^Eribon Didier, Michel Foucault, tr. Betsy Wing (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1991). See his pp. 93-98 for Foucault's views on defining the
limits of culture. See Michele Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. A. M.
Sheridan Smith (London: Tavistock, 1972). Friedrich Nietzsche, Basic Writings
of Nietzsche, ed. and tr. W. Kaufman (New York: Modern Library, 1968). Max
Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment (Dialektek
der Aufklarung (New York: Continuum, 198?. c. 1944)).
67

Conceptualizing...., ed. Mazlish:117; Burke in Hodgson:xii.

M

Corinnc Lathrop Gilb, "Digital Confluence, Space, Time, and Civilization,"
paper to 1995 ISCSC conference at Dayton. Roy D'Andrade, The Development
of Cognitive Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol35/iss35/4

20

